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WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL

471 W. PALMER AVENUE
DETROIT, MICHIGAN 48202
PETER J. HAMMER
PROFESSOR OF LAW

OFFICE: (313) 577-0830
phammer@wayne.edu
SEPTEMBER 1, 2014

The Honorable Stephen W. Rhodes
United States Bankruptcy Court
Eastern District of Michigan
211 West Fort Street
Detroit, Michigan 48226
EVALUATION OF THE "EXPERT REPORT OF MARTHA E.M.
KOPACZ REGARDING THE FEASIBILITY OF THE CITY OF
DETROIT PLAN OF ADJUSTMENT"*
Dear Judge Rhodes:
In response to your Order Regarding the Solicitation ofApplications
to Serve as the Court's Expert Witness on the Issue of Feasibility (April
2, 2014), I submitted my name for consideration. You were generous
enough to include me in the final list of candidates interviewed in open
court.
In my application and interview, I raised a number of methodological
concerns about the types of analyses and qualifications required to make
a meaningful assessment of 1) the reasonableness of the assumptions
that underlie the City's cash flow forecasts and projections and 2) the
feasibility of the City's Plan of Adjustment (POA).

* This letter, presented in slightly edited form, was sent from Peter J. Hammer to
Judge Stephen W. Rhodes on the eve of the Detroit bankruptcy hearings. The central
issue is the "feasibility" of the bankruptcy Plan of Adjustment. "Feasibility" asks, among
other issues, whether sufficient resources will exist post-bankruptcy to address the City's
needs. It is one of the few frames in the bankruptcy process where the needs of Detroit
citizens are considered and given weight.
1. Letter from Peter J. Hammer, Professor of Law, Wayne State Univ. Law School,
to the Honorable Stephen W. Rhodes, U. S. Bankr. Court for the Eastern Dist. of Mich.
(Apr. 9, 2014) (on file with author) (applying to serve as the Court's expert witness on
the issue of feasibility).
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I was particularly concemed that the "balance sheet framework"
embedded in the City's Plan of Adjustment and within the professional
expertise of municipal finance was inadequate to address the full range
of questions at hand. "Creating a viable city requires much more than
balancing revenue and expenses in a narrow accounting framework." 2 A
broader, multidisciplinary set of expertise is required, including expertise
in examining the City's interconnected social, economic and political
systems.
I was further concerned, given the absence of any meaningful
discussion in the City's Plan of Adjustment3 and its Disclosure
Statement,4 that issues of race and regionalism would be marginalized in
the expert analysis, particularly if experts were drawn exclusively from
the field of municipal finance. "A feasible Plan of Adjustment based on
reasonable forecasts and projections must be assessed in light of the
City's history of still unhealed racial conflict and the City's position
within a fractured and segregated regional economy." 5
For example, the divisive history of racial conflict and subsequent
urban neglect affects the political equation for future state revenue
sharing and any discussion over possible regionalization of the Detroit
Water and Sewage Department. Furthermore, the extreme segregation of
race and wealth in the region has direct implications for any analysis of
the labor and housing markets, which, in turn, directly affect future
income and property tax revenue for the City. No defensible economic
analysis can ignore these issues.
I have reviewed the City's Plan of Adjustment and Disclosure
Statement. I have carefully evaluated the "Expert Report of Martha E.M.
Kopacz Regarding the Feasibility of the City of Detroit Plan of
Adjustment." 6 With all due respect to this Court's choice of experts and
with equal respect for the intelligence, sincerity and industry clearly
reflected in the Expert Report, I write to state my opinion regarding the
issues of the reasonableness and feasibility of the City's Plan of
Adjustment.
2. Id. at 2.
3. Fourth Amended Chapter 9 Plan for the Adjustment of Debts for the City of
Detroit, In re City of Detroit Michigan, No. 12-52846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. May 5, 2014).
4. Fourth Amended Disclosure Statement with respect to the Fourth Amended Plan
for the Adjustment of Debts for the City of Detroit, In re City of Detroit Michigan, No.
12-52846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. May 5,2014).
5. Letter from Peter J. Hammer to the Honorable Stephen W. Rhodes, supra, note 1,
at 3.
6. Expert Report of Martha E.M. Kopacz Regarding the Feasibility of the City of
Detroit Plan of Adjustment, In re City of Detroit Michigan, No. 12-52846 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. May 5, 2014) [hereinafter Expert Report].
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Regretfully, the fears motivating my original application have largely
been realized. Methodological limitations in the Expert Report
substantially undermine the integrity of the Report's conclusions. It is
my opinion that a sufficient case has not yet been made in support of the
City's Plan of Adjustment. Serious questions remain as to 1) the
reasonableness of the assumptions underlying the City's cash flow
forecasts and projections and 2) the feasibility of the City's Plan of
Adjustment. Based on the current state of the record and expert analyses,
I do not believe that the Court can approve the City's Plan of
Adjustment.
Part One of this letter examines the methodological issues needed to
assess issues of reasonableness and feasibility. Part Two re-centers
discussion of the Plan of Adjustment in the context of race and
regionalism in Southeast Michigan. The Expert Report's neglect of these
issues has materially affected the quality and nature of its analysis. For
example, the Report embraces a misleading individualistic narrative to
the neglect of appreciating the deeper structures and processes required
to assess the economic and social systems controlling the Region. Part
Three evaluates the reasonableness of the assumptions underlying the
City's cash flow forecasts and projections, highlighting weaknesses in its
assessment of forecasting future revenues. Part Four considers the
feasibility of the City's Plan of Adjustment, highlighting weaknesses in
the definition and assessment of the provision of essential services.
I.

THE IMPORTANCE OF METHODOLOGY AND PROPER FRAMING

In addressing an issue as difficult and unprecedented as the Detroit
Bankruptcy, it is necessary to ask certain foundational questions: How do
we know things? How do we identify gaps in current knowledge (aspects
of the Detroit bankruptcy for which there is no clear present
understanding or no obvious answers)? To what extent can these gaps be
filled with thoughtful application of existing understandings/methods?
To what extent does new knowledge need to be created with new
methods/disciplines/understanding? To what extent can a professional's
own training and expertise actually be an obstacle to understanding
(epistemic constraints)?
Not every issue can be resolved in a complex legal proceeding, but
the Court deserves an accurate mapping of which aspects of which issues
can be answered with what level of certainty. Assessments of
reasonableness and feasibility in the context of the Detroit Bankruptcy
unavoidably raise complex questions, requiring self-conscious
examinations of how complex systems work. How well does the Report
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address this concern? Despite the wide range of difficult issues before it,
the Report addresses only two with a self-conscious appreciation for their
complexity - pensions and Information Technology (IT) systems.
The problem of complexity is dealt with in the most sophisticated
manner in the Report's treatment of pensions. This is a selfacknowledged complex problem, dealt with in an appropriately
sophisticated manner, reflecting existing state-of-the-art understandings.
[T]he pension plans are very complex. The accounting and
actuarial assumptions are difficult to understand; it is even
harder to understand how changes in assumptions may changes
[sic] the City's future financial prospects.
This is a good start. An awareness of the complexity of the problem
is a prerequisite to appreciating the sophistication of the tools and
methods that are needed to address it. For example, an appreciation of
the complexity of the issues underlying forecasting pensions leads to the
corollary insight of needing a sophisticated "stress test" or "sensitivity
analysis" to assess the quality and accuracy of those forecasts.
The Blue Ribbon Panel recommended stress tests measuring the
effect of investment returns over a 20-year period that are three
percentage points above and below those used in calculating
standardized plan contributions. The panel believes that +/- 3%
points represents "plausible stresses" based on its review of prior
market returns. 8
The more rigorous stress testing of pension forecasts was not
conducted (as of the time of the Report) and therefore was not
incorporated into the Expert Report's final analysis. 9

7. Id. at 177. Additional references noting the complexity of pensions include:
"Assessing the City's future pension and OPEB responsibilities involves, among other
factors, forecasted health care costs, complex actuarial models, and assumptions for the
anticipated rate of returns on the pensions' assets and the rate used to discount the plans'
future liabilities." Id. at 124. "The accounting for defined benefit plans can be very
complex. The calculations used to determine the appropriate funding levels required each
year are dependent upon macro-economic factors, actuarial assumptions, and other
variables that can be difficult to understand and can be manipulated to bias the required
funding levels." Id. at 127.
8. Idat 152.
9. "We have requested sensitivity analysis for GRS consistent with the PFRS
sensitivity analysis highlighted above. At the time of this Report's release, we have not
been provided the GRS sensitivity analysis." Id. at 154.
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This type of approach should serve as a template for the analysis of
other complex economic issues relating to reasonablenessandfeasibility.
Unfortunately, the only other area of the POA that the Expert Report
approaches self-consciously in terms of its inherent complexity is the
planned reform of the City's IT systems. This raises not only an issue of
"complexity," but also the challenges associated with trying to reform a
complex system.
Large IT systems initiatives have historically contained an
inherent risk. McKinsey & Co. notes that: "As IT systems
become an important competitive element in many industries,
technology projects are getting larger, touching more parts of the
organization, and posing a risk to the company if something goes
wrong. Unfortunately, things often do go wrong." 10
Tellingly, this is one of the few instances where the Report uses the
notion of a "root cause" analysis. "The root causes of cost overruns in IT
systems implementations for projects over $15 million include: unclear
objectives and lack of business focus, shifting requirements and technical
complexity, unaligned teams, lack of skills, unrealistic schedule and
reactive planning.""
Again, the root cause analysis used to assess IT system reforms can
serve as a template for the types of analyses required for assessing
reforms to complex systems more generally. The lessons are clear. IT
systems are complex. It is difficult to reform complex systems. As a
result, extreme caution must be employed in approaching the problem.
Unfortunately, the Expert Report fails to appreciate and therefore
address the existence complexity underlying other significant aspects of
the Plan of Adjustment. The entire POA is an effort to reform a complex
adaptive system infinitely more challenging than the transformation of
the City's IT system. The POA implicates complex systems of
interrelated property markets, labor markets, essential city services and
regional integration; yet these issues are not acknowledged as raising
"complex" concerns. Nor, is any effort made to bring to bear the
sophisticated forms of analyses required to address them adequately.

10. See id. at 121 (quoting Michael Bloch, Sven Blumberg & Jilrgen Laartz,
Delivering large-scale IT projects on time, on budget, and on value, McKINSEY & CO.
(Oct. 2012), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/businesstechnology/deliveringlargescale itprojects on time on budgetand-on_value).
11. Id. at 121-22 (citing McKinsey Report on City of Detroit as posted on the City of
Detroit website (May 2011)).
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This raises a number of concerns. Without appropriate methods and
forms of analysis, it is not possible to know whether the POA is
reasonable or feasible. Moreover, the Expert Report gives this court a
false sense of certainty about what it knows. While the Report
occasionally stresses the remaining unknowns that may be implicated,
this is a very simplistic way to assess residual risk and reflects the
Report's overall failure to address the problem of the POA as a complex,
interconnected system.1 2
One of the primary weaknesses of the Expert Report is its failure to
properly diagnose the underlying problems (engaging in a "root cause"
analysis) and its failure to apply tools and methods appropriate to the
complex challenges at hand in the Detroit Bankruptcy. Tellingly, the
Report acknowledges as complex issues and employs more sophisticated
forms of analyses for only those issues where there is a similar reflection
in the literature and, therefore, off-the-shelf tools and methods to address
the problem. The Detroit Bankruptcy does not present a run of the mill
set of problems. For many central issues, such as the operations of the
Detroit real estate market, appropriate tools and methods do not exist and
expert analysis must go beyond that found in the standard literature.
The Report fails to identify the complexity of many aspects of the
economic assessment of reasonableness and feasibility. To not even see
these knowledge gaps means that the Report contains many blind spots
and applies simple and inadequate forms of analysis that could easily
mislead this Court. An equally troubling part of the Report is its
12. The Expert Report includes a general caution about the role of unknown factors:

It should be noted that this opinion is rendered in an environment where there
are many factors that will have influence on the City's conditions post
confirmation that are unknown and unknowable. Throughout this Report, I
have noted some of these factors, while other factors may not even be
recognized today as potentially having an impact. My opinion is necessarily
limited by these unknown factors. It should be recognized, that these factors,
when known, could have a material impact on my view of feasibility.
Id. at 10, 204. In addition, the Report generates an ad hoc list of the unknown factors that
may generate unexpected outcomes: 1) macro-economic issues; 2) state and federal
funding; 3) impact of private parties; 4) exit financing and access to capital markets; 5)

fate of the DWSD; 6) terms of the sale of assets; 7) and tipping points. Id. at 192-98. The
Report suggests, among other things, a reserve of more than 1% to deal with these

contingencies. "The risks associated with the IT initiatives alone, warrant additional
financial contingency beyond the general 1% assumption in the POA projections." Id. at
122. Greater appreciation of systems thinking and complexity, however, suggests more
appropriate ways to assess and manage complexity and risk. The first and most important
of these is a proper diagnosis and understanding of the problem in its entirety. The second
is the adoption of appropriate methods of analysis to accurately map what we know and

what knowledge gaps exist. Third is to apply the right combination of expertise to
address the actual complexities in the underlying problems.
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conscious decision to ignore other important dimensions of the problem
contributing the City's financial distress that are clearly known and
knowable to any caring observer.
II.

A.

RACE, STRUCTURE AND MISLEADING MYTHS OF TRIUMPHANT
INDIVIDUALISM

Substantive Implications

As I stated in court during my interview, any legitimate analysis of
the Detroit Bankruptcy and the City's Plan of Adjustment must be
situated in the context of the Three R's-Race, Regionalism and
Reconciliation. Indeed, that conviction was the primary motivation for
my application. I am deeply disappointed by the neglect of these issues
in the Expert Report. The Report is a word-searchable pdf document.
Nowhere in the document are the words "race," '"racism,"
"discrimination" or "segregation." While the phrase "white paper"
appears twice, the phrase "white flight" does not appear at all. These are
the root causes of Detroit's current financial crisis and yet they are
completely absent from the report. The Report looks at the root causes of
failures of generic IT Systems, but never once examines the root causes
of the fiscal crisis underlying Detroit's municipal distress.
My concern about the Three R's stems from my training as an
economist. I operate on the assumption that if you do not know the cause
of a problem, it is very difficult to figure out how to solve it. This is
particularly true for complicated economic and social problems. Rather
than placing the financial problems of Detroit within the context of race
and regionalism, Section D of the Expert Report, which is devoted to
"Context," adopts the odd and vacuous notion of accepting Detroit "as
is." 13 Without even defining the notion, the "as is" label becomes a
substitute for analysis. As such, the Report's only effort to even
obliquely raise the issue of race produces a sentence that is nearly
incomprehensible: "Black, white, Republican, Democrat, poor, wealthy,
educated, illiterate and everyone in between have an opportunity to
contribute to the virtuous cycle of revitalization, or not."' 4 What does this
mean?
On a few occasions, the Report makes an attempt to describe how the
City's problems came about. To the best of my knowledge, there are only
three short passages where the Report tries to provide context into the
City's current problems beyond the "as is" baseline:
13. Id. at 22, 24-25.
14. Id. at 24.
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At every level, Detroit was failing as a city - as measured by the
shrinking of its population, useful infrastructure and purposeful
enterprises - and as a government - as measured by its inability
to deliver essential services.1 5
Detroit's fifty year decline was caused by changing
demographics, economics and the failure of elected officials to
respond effectively. The downward spiral finally resulted in the
City filing for Bankruptcy.' 6
The City of Detroit, due to its shrinking population, depressed
economy, and sagging property values, has experienced a
metastasizing urban blight condition over the past several
decades."
No effort is made beyond this to state why these phenomena
occurred. There is no discussion of an eighty year history of
discrimination, segregation, racial tension and white flight, producing a
dysfunctional region. There is no discussion of how economic markets
nested in a hostile and highly fractured geopolitical space fail to thrive.
These are the core forces that produced the Bankruptcy, yet they are not
recognized in the Expert Report at all.
One has to try hard not to see the effects of these forces on the
physical landscape of Southeast Michigan. Detroit is a city where nearly
40% of the population lives below the federal poverty level, yet it sits in
a region that is defined by its relative wealth and prosperity. The
Michigan Roundtable for Diversity and Inclusion and the Kirwan
Institute of Race and Ethnicity at Ohio State have conducted
"opportunity mapping" of the region.' 8 "Opportunity," defined by a
metric reflecting the quality of housing, education, employment, health
care, transportation, and civil society, can be assessed and given a
colored representation on a map of Southeast Michigan.' 9 (A copy of the
map is reproduced as an appendix to this Letter). What becomes obvious
from the map is that there are high and low levels of opportunity in the
region and that these areas are spatially segregated. One can almost see
15. Id. at 24-25.
16. Id. at 157.
17. Id. at 167.
18. JASON REECE, KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY,
OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL: INEQUITY, LINKED FATE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN DETROIT AND

MICHIGAN (2008), http://www.kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/reports/2008/07_2008_MIRound

tableOppMapFullReport.pdf.
19. Id. at 21.
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the outlines of the geopolitical boundaries of Detroit and Pontiac as
defining the lowest levels of opportunity in the region. When one
overlies spatial mappings of race on top of the mapping of opportunity,
one sees a region completely segregated in terms of both race and
opportunity.20 (A copy of the map is reproduced as an appendix to this
Letter). This is the core of what John Powell terms "spatial racism" in
modem America. 2 1 Detroit is ground zero for spatial racism.
Detroit remains one of the most racially and economically segregated
regions in the country, yet there is no trace of this realization in the
Expert Report. Its absence is even more troubling given my
conversations with Ms. Kopacz shortly after her appointment as Expert.22
In a cordial and constructive conversation, I raised many of these exact
concerns, particularly the significance of regional opportunity mapping.
In a follow-up email, I included references to a number of supporting
documents including direct links to the Kirwan Institute Report cited
here. A choice was made here not to incorporate this analysis.
Other absences also define the Report. Tellingly, the word "poverty"
appears only once in the entire 226-page Report, and then only in the
context of defining criteria for participation in the pension income
stabilization fund.23 The failure to consider the economic effects of
poverty is inexcusable. Endemic, structural poverty lies at the heart of
the tax foreclosure crisis, the collapse of the real estate markets and the
water shutoffs that have triggered international condemnation. These
factors are critical to any serious economic assessment of reasonableness
and feasibility, yet they appear nowhere in the Expert Report. The
absence of such analyses substantially undermines the credibility and
usefulness of the Report's conclusions.
B.

Implications of Cognitive Frames

Incorporating issues of race, systems and structure into the expert
analysis matters for additional reasons - thinking about these issues in
the right way also changes the way one thinks. Cognitive frames can be
controlling of outcomes. Frames and associational priming create
cascading systems of thought that generate predictable sets of inferences.
If one adopts the frame of The Three R's-Race Regionalism and
Reconciliation-one immediately creates a cognitive frame that

20. Id. at 22.
21. JOHN POWELL,

RACING TO JUSTICE: TRANSFORMING OUR CONCEPTION OF SELF AND
OTHER TO BUILD AN INCLUSIVE SOCIETY 147-50 (2012).

22. Expert Report, supra note 6, at 218.
23. Id. at 108.
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resonates associationally with systems, processes and structure. In
contrast, when one adopts a frame that consciously ignores these factors,
one creates a counter frame with very different associational references.
The dominant frame of our country echoes in archetypes of
individualism. If one is not thinking about systems and groups, one is
likely thinking in terms of atonistic individuals making rational choices
in relative social isolation. Sadly, this is the defining frame of the Expert
Report. The adoption of such a 'frame is not inconsequential. Official
reports can be approached as social artifacts. They reflect the belief
system of the individuals, epistemic communities and institutions that
produce them. 24 This is true of the Kopacz Expert Report.
The Report's individualistic cognitive frame distorts its analysis in a
number of ways, likely beyond the authors' conscious awareness.
Individual, atomistic frames are associated with predictable patterns and
tendencies. For. example, such frames are likely to 1) blame individuals
and not systems for problems, 2) focus on choice and culture (not
structure) as explanations for social outcomes, and 3) exaggerate the role
of individuals in producing collective results-"great men" theories of
history. In contrast, systems frames, such as that found in theories of
structuralized racialization, are associated with other predictable patterns
and tendencies. A systems frame would highlight the significance of
history and context (the Three R's), emphasize the role of structureyour zip code in Southeast Michigan is a greater predictor of your likely
life achievement than your aptitude-and acknowledge the importance of
complexity and interconnectivity, such as emphasizing the role of
regional markets in the POA's economic analyses.
In truth, most analyses reflect combinations of systemic and
individual factors - the difference is in their emphases and the
prioritization of causal relations. The Expert Report contains two striking
illustrations of a controlling atomistic frame. One is the Report's analysis
of city workers. The other is the Report's tendency to exaggerate the role
of particular individuals in producing social outcomes, such as the roles
of the Mayor and the Emergency Manager and the Report's persistent
emphasis on individual "skill & will" as controlling factors.
Section K of the Report is devoted to "Human Capital and
Leadership."2 5 The strongest language in the Report reflective of true

24. PETER HAMMER, CHANGE AND CONTNUITY AT THE WORLD BANK: REFORMING

PARADOXES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2013); Peter J. Hammer, Development as
Tragedy: The Asian Development Bank and Indigenous People in Cambodia, in LIVING
ON THE MARGINS: MINORITIES AND BORDERLINES IN CAMBODIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

(Peter Hammer ed., 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1 371595.
25. Expert Report, supra note 6, at 157-66.
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moral outrage can be found in this section and it is reserved for Detroit
city workers. Two references are made to the "vortex of
underachievement", responsibility for which is laid at the feet of city
employees. 26 "There are also employees who don't grasp that their job is
to provide a service to the taxpayers versus the taxpayers owing them a
job."27 The quality of workers is disparaged elsewhere in the Report as
well. "Current human resources are lacking and senior leadership, while
generally capable is not plentiful."2 8 The causal explanation for the
"vortex of underachievement" is an alleged "cultural malady" that will
"have to change if Detroit is to be successful." 29 Anyone doing racial
equity work would have counseled the author, at a minimum, to use
different language. The words in the Report echo insensitively close to
blame-oriented explanations of an asserted "culture of poverty."
The Report's focus on individuals and its resort to individual blame
is ironic, because the same section of the Report is rife with alternative
insights suggesting the significant role that systems, structure and
processes play as co-explanations for the broken state of City services.
"Throughout our discussion in the finance and accounting functions it
has been noted: 'Many qualified and experienced employees have left
theirjobs over concerns about the long term prospects of theirpositions;
Difficulty in replacing employees with qualified personnel because
salary structure is no longer reasonable and competitive. '3 Elsewhere,
the Report acknowledges that the city workers who have not left have
suffered wage reductions of 10%3' and must work side-by-side with

highly paid external consultants who judgmentally are doing work that
city workers should be doing "but are not sufficiently trained to do so.",32
Furthermore, the Report acknowledges that the POA will predictably
make things worse (not better), by further reducing benefits and moving
to a defined contribution systems benefits.3 3 This will make future hiring
and retention of city. workers even more uncertain than the troubled
past.34
Connecting the dots from a structural perspective would lead to
advocating for the type of systemic reforms that would make positions in
Detroit competitive with public jobs elsewhere in the Region. This would
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

164.
159.
201.
159 (emphasis added).
159-60 (emphasis in original).
160.
163.
160.
161.
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require paying market wages and providing market benefits. Instead, the
POA allocates insufficient resources to make these key positions
competitive, creating the need for additional triage in human resource
allocation in the future. True to its individualistic frame, however, the
Report advocates "hiring fewer but more skilled employees" if
"compensation is a barrier to hiring the skilled talent required." 3 5 A few
gifted and heroic individuals, so the Report would.have us believe, will
be able to overcome the challenges of a continuously broken and underresourced system.
The greatest illustration of the atomistic bias in the Report, however,
is its indulgence of the "great man" theory of history and its invocation
of the hero archetype. There is an acknowledged economic, political and
financial crisis in Detroit. Given that the POA fails to identify the root
structural causes of the crisis and implement necessary structural
reforms, one must invent a hero to'single-handedly rescue the City from
the current crisis, if there is to be any hope.
The heroes here are the Mayor and the Emergency Manager. "I have
confidence in Mayor Duggan. My opinion of feasibility is favorably
influenced by my view of Mayor Duggan as a leader and an operational
executive." 36 Indeed, as in any good myth, if it were not for the newfound hero riding to the rescue, all would be lost. The Report places the
economic assessment of the feasibility of the entire Plan of Adjustment
on a knife's edge. The day is saved by placing the burden of feasibility
squarely on the shoulders of the mythically invoked hero. "I can say,
unequivocally, that without the positive and capable leadership of Mayor
Duggan and the constructive relationship between the City Council and
the Mayor, I would be unable to opine that the plan, as currently
proposed, is feasible." 37
I find this statement as remarkable as it is troubling. As an economist
and someone who understands complex systems, I can envision no
scenario in which a single individual, no matter how gifted, could rescue
the city in the absence of having appropriate systems, structures and
processes in place to address the root causes of the City's financial
distress. Individuals, without the aid of properly designed systems have
no such superpowers. Such a conclusion is indefensible and absurd from
a systems perspective that properly weighs the role of economic and
structural analysis. It is magical thinking. In saying this, I stress that
there is no malicious intent in the expert analysis. The reliance on myths
and the invocation of- heroic archetypes are often revelatory of the
35. Id. at 162-63.
36. Id. at 164.
37. Id. at 29.
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knowledge gaps and weaknesses embedded in the expert's own tools,
analysis, training and epistemic constraints. This is why the foundational
methodological framing stressed earlier is so important. If you do not ask
the right questions and adopt the right methodologies, you will not get
useful insights and answers. It is a predictable aspect of human nature to
resort to myths to restore order when our own frames and tools are
inadequate to the task.
The analytical weaknesses of the Report become evident in its
treatment of the issues of reasonablenessandfeasibility.
III.

THE REASONABLENESS OF THE ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE
CITY'S FORECASTS

As an economist, what I am most struck by in the Expert Report is
the absence of any effort to model the underlying economic problems as
a basis for forecasting future revenues and expenses. Indeed, there is
little theory, methodology or developed frameworks specified in the
Expert Report to justify its assessment of the reasonablenessof the POA
or to substantiate its conclusions.
The term "macro" is used in the report on seven occasions, but only
twice in reference to the type of macro-economic concerns an economist
might anticipate38 Rather, a "macro" for purposes of the Report is the
often hidden and undefined formulas embedded in excel spreadsheets.
The term "model" is used in this Report to describe the one or
more excel spreadsheets that together form a financial
projection. A "values only model" or "flat model" is essentially a
printout of the excel spreadsheets, although it may be provided
in electronic format rather than in hard copy. A "working model"
contains all the cell references, formulas and "macro" commands
that are within the spreadsheets and allows a reviewer of the
model to understand what the inputs and assumptions are that
create the projections. It is in the working model that a reviewer
can understand the "art" of the analyst's modeling.39
Whether it is art or something else is difficult to tell, because for all
intents and purposes these "macros" exist in multiple black boxes held
by different external consultants and somehow aggregated together to
produce the POA. Little revealed in the Expert Report permits an
intelligent review or evaluation of these hidden assessments. If I were
38. Id. at 127, 193.
39. Id. at 14-15 n.10.
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tasked with the job of doing a professional critique of the specific
analysis, I would have nowhere to begin.
In the absence of a clearly specified model, a logical evaluation
would start by trying to test the most objective and externally verifiable
aspects of the economic analysis. This would point to the casino revenue.
Casino revenue should be the easiest forecast to get right, because it is
mostly influenced by national trends without the complicated,
dysfunctional characteristics that plague Detroit's labor and property
markets. A report by Reuters is very critical of the POA's casino revenue
assessments. 40 The article criticizes the POA for making assumptions of
a 0.5% growth rate in casino revenues between 2016-17 and a 1%
growth rate 2018-2023, when the national growth of casino revenue is
actually likely to decline. The decline is due to the fact that younger
demographics are not entering the market and the market is experiencing
more competitive entry, such as the new casinos in Ohio that compete
with Detroit.
None of these complicating considerations are addressed in the
Expert Report. When one reads a legal brief or listens to a legal
argument, one tests the credibility of the whole by how well the advocate
deals with the most objective and verifiable facts. If these issues are not
dealt with well, one's skepticism of the entire case increases. If the POA
is not being forthcoming with the casino revenue, how credible is its
assessments of more complicated and difficult issues?
As I told the Court during my interview, the most complicated
economic forecasting concerns the future of Detroit's real estate market.
I told the Court that this was a regional market that had to be looked at in
a regional context. I further told the Court that the historic collapse of the
Detroit real estate market was the product of racial conflict and that its
future recovery could not adequately be assessed without express
consideration of prospective race relations (reconciliation). Troublingly,
none of these concerns are incorporated in the economic analysis of the
Expert Report.
Not only are these issues missing in the analysis, there is absolutely
no effort to introduce a theory, methodology or framework that could
intelligently inform the analysis of the likely future course of Detroit's
property market. This is an essential component of forecasting property
value and therefore property tax revenue. There is no appreciation of the
inherent complexity of these issues, as was acknowledged in the Report's
pension analysis. This highlights the reflexive nature of the Report's
40. Tim Reid and Michael Erman, Detroit Rolls Dice by Relying on Casino Cash,
(June 9, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/09/usadetroit-casinos-idUSLINOON2BO20140609.
REUTERS
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analysis. The Report addresses pensions as a complex problem and
therefore deals with it in a relatively sophisticated manner because that is
the state of the art recognition of the literature. The Report fails to
address the complexities of Detroit's real estate market and deal with it
in a sophisticated manner because there is no off-the-shelf analysis to
frame the problem. As the earlier discussion of methodology makes
clear, this is understandable, but not excusable.
Even a cursory examination of the recent literature (none of which
was cited or assessed in the Expert Report), reveals the complexities of
the problem. Allen C. Goodman conducts an extensive econometric
evaluation of housing stocks in central U.S. Cities between 2000 and
2010, a period encompassing the immediate effects of the Great
Recession. 4 1 The author's main conclusion is that while traditional
economic theory can explain some parts of the changes in housing
markets, there are important parts of what is happening in cities like
Detroit that traditional economic theory simply cannot explain. "Market
fundamentals help explain many of the changes, but performances in
cities like Detroit were generally worse than could be explained by the
models. . . . it appears that indeed large portions of many American
Central cities have been 'thrown away.",A 2 This reinforces the need to
ask foundational methodological questions. Off-the-shelf municipal
accounting and economic theory cannot address the issues underlying
Detroit's property market and Bankruptcy.
When markets start to fail, the challenges facing them become more
and more difficult. An illustration of this fact can again be found in the
current economic literature on the Detroit housing market. The sale of an
individual house conveys pricing information about the entire market
that benefits many different stakeholders. Reliable information about
pricing, in turn, is essential for the market to function effectively. When
there are fewer sales, there is less information, which can lead the entire
market to unravel and fail. Lei Ding of the Federal Reserve Bank in
Philadelphia examines this phenomenon as it relates to Detroit. 43 The
negative feedback loop can be triggered at very low thresholds in
distressed markets. The odds of a new buyer being denied a mortgage
"increase 32 percent if the number of previous mortgagee purchasers is
no greater than five."44 Unfortunately, this threshold for a "failed"
41. Allen Goodman, Is there an S in Urban Housing Supply? Or What on Earth

Happened in Detroit, 22 J. Hous. ECON. 179 (2013).
42. Id. at 190.
&

43. Lei Ding, Information Externalities and Residential Mortgage Lending in the
Hardest Hit Housing Market: The Case of Detroit, 16 CITYSCAPE: J. POLIcY DEV.

233 (2014).
44. Id. at 242.
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market encompasses almost the entire footprint of the city of Detroit.4 5
(A copy of the map is reproduced as an appendix to this Letter).
Tellingly, the absence of comparable distress (and therefore presence of
opportunity) characterizes most of the rest of the region. The same reality
is illustrated in the opportunity mapping discussed earlier.
The desperate shape of the housing market and the ways in which
such a crisis defies contemporary economic theories and models are why
I told the Court that this was the most challenging task facing whomever
was selected as an expert. You cannot assess the future property values
without modeling the real estate market. You cannot forecast future tax
revenue without knowing property tax values. The absence of any such
realizations in the Report substantially undermines the credibility of the
Report and the veracity of its conclusions.
It is one thing to fault an Expert Report for not citing the most recent
economics literature on the Detroit housing market. This may be
excusable. It is not excusable, however, for the Report to fail to address
the current tax and mortgage foreclosure crisis (both of which are
reflections of the endemic high levels of poverty in the city) in its
assessment of future property tax revenues. Remarkably, the word
"foreclosure" appears nowhere in the Expert Report. The Report
repeatedly cites the Detroit Blight Removal Task Force Report
(DBRTFR), but fails to incorporate its teaching on tax foreclosures.46
Since 2008, the beginning of the Great Recession, more than 60,000
Detroit properties have gone through the tax foreclosure process. 47 The
numbers in the tax foreclosure pipeline are even greater. "At this
moment, more than 76,000 properties across Detroit are subject to tax
foreclosure because the property owners have not paid their taxes in
more than three years. More than 42,000 are tax distressed and on their
way to foreclosure, with unpaid taxes for at least one year (but not yet
three years delinquent)."48 That is a total of nearly 180,000 properties
either tax foreclosed or at risk since 2008.
These are mind-blowing statistics that bear directly on the issues of
reasonablenessand feasibility. They document the devastating effects of
poverty in Detroit and the complete collapse of the City's real estate
market. These numbers represent people losing their homes for the
inability to pay taxes,. let alone the need to pay for water, utilities,
insurance and mortgages. How can an Expert Report ostensibly
45. Id. at 247.
46. DETROIT BLIGHT REMOVAL TASK FORCE REPORT, EVERY NEIGHBORHOOD HAS A
FUTURE ... AND IT DOESN'T INCLUDE BLIGHT (2014) [hereinafter DBRTFR].

47. Id. at 200.
48. Id.
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examining the reasonableness of future property tax revenue forecasts
not even raise this issue?
The tax foreclosure crisis does not stand in isolation. To this disaster
must be added the mortgage foreclosure crisis, fueled by racialized
predatory Wall Street practices. Adkins v. Morgan Stanley is a class
action race discrimination case brought by the ACLU challenging subprime lending practices in Detroit tailored to meet the demands of the
secondary lending market. The case is now pending in the Southern
District of New York. In denying Morgan Stanley's motion to dismiss,
Judge Harold Baer directly linked the issues before him to the Detroit
Bankruptcy.
Detroit's recent bankruptcy filing only emphasizes the broader
consequences of predatory lending and the foreclosures that
inevitably result. Indeed, "[b]y 2012, banks had foreclosed on
100,000 homes [in Detroit], which drove down the city's total
real estate value by 30 percent and spurred a mass exodus of
nearly a quarter million people." Laura Gottesdiener, Detroit's
Debt Crisis: Everything Must Go, Rolling Stone, June 20, 2013.
The resulting blight stemming from "60,000 parcels of vacant
land" and "78,000 vacant structures, of which 38,000 are
estimated to be in potentially dangerous condition" has further
strained Detroit's already taxed resources. Kevyn D. Orr,
Financial and Operating Plan 9 (2013). And as residents flee the
city, Detroit's shrinking ratepayer base renders its financial
outlook even bleaker. Id. Given these conditions, it is not
difficult to conclude that Detroit's current predicament, at least
in part, is an outgrowth of the predatory lending at issue here.49
All of these issues are interrelated. The tax and mortgage foreclosure
crises, endemic poverty, the collapse of the Detroit real estate market and
the question of the reasonableness of the POA's projection of future
property tax revenue. If the economic connections are so clear to a
federal judge sitting hundreds of miles away, why are these issues
completely absent from the Expert Report?
Rather than engaging in appropriate economic and structural analysis
of these issues, the Report collapses back to its mythical individualistic
frame. Completely ignoring the question of endemic poverty and the
tsunami of tax foreclosures, the Report reduces the problem of property
tax collection to a simple question of individual "skill and will."
49. Adkins v. Morgan Stanley, No. 12. Civ. 7667, 2013 WL 3835198, at 3-4
(S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2013).
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As I noted in my definition of feasibility, the second assessment
prong of feasibility is "will and skill." Leadership, political and
intestinal fortitude define "will" and talent and training equate to
"skill." For example, in order to arrest the downward trend of
revenue, City employees must do a better job of collecting the
taxes and fees that are currently due-that is skill.o
In the face of the tax and mortgage foreclosure crisis and the collapse
of the real estate market, the City needs much more than "intestinal
fortitude" and more highly "skilled" tax collectors. It needs a rigorous
examination of future revenues, methods of collection and structures of
tax assessment that are predicated on the realities of endemic poverty and
limited resources. Such critical elements are completely missing from the
POA and the Expert Report.
The extreme mismatch between the Expert's Report's understanding
of the underlying economic problems and the tools it brings to bear in
assessing reasonableness and feasibility is further illustrated in the
Report's purported "sensitivity" analysis of the property tax revenue
projections.5 ' There are a number of problems. The first limitation is that
the Report engages only in a single scenario analysis. Given the
complicated nature of the economic problems, profound gaps in
knowledge and the absence of off-the-shelf models of analysis, a single
scenario analysis can be profoundly misguided. The real risk is not that
the forecast will be a little off (l%-3%). The real risk is that the entire
model is unfounded and that the forecasts will be wrong by orders of
magnitude. In this setting, one would like to test the robustness of the
underlying specification of the model. This was not done. Given the
multiple "black boxes" in which the excel spreadsheet macros sit; it is
unlikely that any one person could identify the real "specification"
underlying the analysis and therefore test its robustness.
As such, the analysis underlying the POA is sitting on a tinderbox of
unknown and unstated assumptions that defy any legitimate sensitivity
analysis. In such a situation, based on the current state of the record, it is
nearly impossible to do any credible assessment of reasonableness or
feasibility. Similar critiques could be made of the thin economic analysis
of labor markets and likely income tax revenue in the report.

50. Expert Report, supra note 6, at 158.
51. This statement becomes even truer if one anticipates the planned reappraisal of
property values and the restructuring of property tax rates. Even if done in a manner that
is intended to increase revenue and equity, such structural reforms introduce additional
forms of uncertainty into the analysis.
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Given the many problems and limitations in the existing record, the
kindest professional opinion I can render is that the case has not yet been
made to support the legal conclusion that the POA is reasonable.
IV.

THE FEASIBILITY OF THE CITY'S PLAN OF ADJUSTMENT

The most important decision the court is likely to make in the entire
bankruptcy proceeding will be its legal and factual determinations
regarding feasibility. This is the only legal frame in the bankruptcy
process where the needs of the average Detroit citizen are given priority.
The Court's decision will determine not only the quality of life of the
citizens of Detroit for decades to come; it will also determine the fates of
scores of similar cities that will likely pass through Chapter 9 proceeding
in the coming years. Like Detroit, the majority of these cities will be
characterized by endemic poverty. Since poverty is racialized in this
country, these cities will also predominately be majority minority central
cities, surrounded by wealthier white suburban regions. As such, the
bankruptcy determination of feasibility is also a determination of the
future lives and livelihoods of the citizens of these cities and what stake
they will be given in the American dream.
The 5 0th anniversary of the 1967 urban rebellion in Detroit is on the
horizon. Echoes of urban unrest resonate in the recent confrontations in
Ferguson, Missouri. In my own research this summer, I had occasion to
revisit the Kerner Commission Report, prepared in the wake of the late
1960s urban violence. Its famous conclusion is worth repeating: "Our
nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white - separate
and unequal." 52
What most people fail to recall is that a good portion of the Kemer
Commission Report-What can be done?-consisted of a broad range of
policy prescriptions that could reverse negative trends in cities and create
greater equality and shared opportunity. As such, the Kerner
Commission Report can be viewed as its own Plan of Adjustment,
detailing the types of programs and investments necessary to provide
essential services in cities like Detroit. The Kerner Commission Report
outlines proposals for employment, education, the welfare system and
housing, in addition to reforms in police departments and practices. The
document was a national call to action to invest in our cities and its
residents. "This alternative will require a commitment to national
action-compassionate, massive and sustained, backed by the resources
52. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, I (1968),

www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.pdf (commonly referred to as the Kemer
Commission Report)
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of the most powerful and the richest nation on this earth. From every
American it will require new attitudes, new understanding, and, above
all, new will."5 3

That "new will" never materialized. Dr. Martin Luther King spoke of
the "promissory note" issued by the Constitution and Declaration of
Independence.54 In his famous "Dream" speech, he declared that he
"refuse[d] to believe that the bank of justice is bankrupt"'5 5 Dr. King may
have been wrong.
The promise remains unfulfilled in the context of the Detroit
Bankruptcy. Indeed, the maps attached as exhibits to this letter illustrate
the contemporary reality of the separate and unequal, black and white
societies prophesied by the Kerner Commission Report as defining
characteristics of Southeast Michigan. We can give the counties in these
spatially segregated locations names-Oakland, Macomb, Washtenawand we can list its cities-Livonia, West Bloomfield, Troy and Ann
Arbor.
Central cities have increasingly become separate, unequal, minimal
cities, with minimal wealth, minimal opportunity and minimal city
services. The question for this Court is whether Chapter 9 determinations
of feasibility will be the instrumentality that legally ratifies the second
class status of these economically deprived cities.
I admire the Expert Report's effort to wrestle with the difficult
question of feasibility. The Report's definition is a useful point of
departure.
Is it likely that the City of Detroit, after the confirmation of the
Plan of Adjustment, will be able to sustainably provide basic
municipal services to the citizens of Detroit and to meet the
obligations contemplated in the Plan without the significant
probability of a default? 56
In examining the Report's analysis of feasibility, however, one is
again stuck by the absence of any developed theory, methodology or
framework to define what "basic municipal services" are and therefore to
assess whether they are sufficiently provided for in the POA.

53. Id. at 1.
54. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Address at March on Washington
for Jobs and Freedom (Aug. 28, 1963), http://mlk-kppOl.stanford.edulindex.php/
encyclopedia/documentsentry/docaugust_28_1963 i have a _dream/.
55. Id.
56. Expert Report, supra note 6, at 13.
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The Report contains many statements as to what feasibility is not.
According to the Report, feasibility is not about "whether there may be
alternative plans that could produce better outcomes for the city." 57 In
addition, the authors state: "I do not need to determine that Detroit will
become a best in class municipality to determine that the POA is
feasible."" Much less is said about what feasibility is. Apparently, one
benchmark is the provision of "adequate and reasonable service
delivery", 59 but no effort is made to define what those services are or
what is meant by "adequate and reasonable." 60
What services are "basic" or "essential?" What services are not?
What do residents in a city need or deserve? Is the answer to this
question the same for all communities, races and areas of the country?
Should one look to neighboring communities to make these
determinations? There is no guidance in the Expert Report or the POA to
these questions.
Simply for analytic purposes, it is helpful to have some benchmarks
from which to assess the feasibility of the POA and the types of services
that should be provided. The components of employment, education,
welfare, and housing found in the Kerner Commission Report could be
one such benchmark. Standards of economic development theory might
be another useful source. Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen
lists five types of instrumental freedoms that governments have an
obligation to provide: 1) political freedoms (basic civil rights, including
rights to vote and participate in democratic governance); 2) economic
facilities (the ability of individuals to fully participate in economic
markets and have fair access to economic resources); 3) social
opportunity (including access to quality education and health care); 4)
transparency guarantees (mandates of openness in governance, including
disclosure rights and protections against political corruption and financial
irresponsibility); and 5) protective security (including social safety nets,
unemployment benefits, income supplements and the provision of
physical security). One can also envision the basic building blocks
necessary for a healthy society as basic reference points: physical

57. Id. at 20.
58. Id. at 19.
59. Id.
60. At one point, the Kopacz Expert Report states: "The role as the Court's expert on
feasibility is both vast and specific, and subsumed within a unique set of facts and
circumstances surrounding the City of Detroit, its history and plethora of challenges." Id.
at 22. This and other statements are lacking in much helpful guidance for analysis.
61. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 38-40 (1999). See also MARTHA
NussBAUM, CREATING CAPACITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2011).
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security, food security, social security, economic security and spiritual
security.
How does the POA rate on these scales? The City's POA embodies
the complete devolution of distressed cities into second-class "minimal
cities," as lamented by Michelle Anderson. 6 2 While a slight
oversimplification, the POA envisions a post-bankrupt city that
essentially provides only 1) police protection; 2) fire protection; and 3)
the demolition of blighted buildings. At its base, this is an anemic list of
"essential" services that provide only a shadow of the services required
to take care of the needs of city residents and to provide them any
meaningful opportunity for the future.
When the POA is juxtaposed to the opportunity mapping of
Southeast Michigan, the implications are clear (see exhibits to this letter).
The state-appointed Emergency Manager wants this Court to ratify as
feasible and, therefore, legitimize the de facto existence of "two
societies, one black, one white-separate and unequal."
No one questions the importance of police and fire protection.
"Physical security" is the first building block for creating a sustainable
society. What the POA fails to appreciate is that there are other essential
building blocks for a healthy society-food security, social security,
health security and opportunity security. These later items are grossly
neglected in the POA. Indeed, focusing on physical security to the
neglect of the other building blocks is short-sighted and self-defeating.
Young men are not out scrapping for metals in abandoned homes
because that is the first best use of their time in an ideal society. People
make the best choices that are available to them. When a whole range of
productive, healthy and fulfilling choices are denied, other choices are
made. If the POA is ratified with its focus on physical security and not
human security, it could result in an endless spiral of violence and
increased physical repression as people in deprived minimalist cities
become more and more opportunity starved and desperate. Civilized
societies invest in the other building blocks of society not because they
are luxuries, but because they are necessary for the existence of civilized
societies.
The POA's focus on property rather than people is clear. While the
POA makes no serious investment in creating opportunities for people,
the POA contains substantial funds for the demolition of buildings. The
Blight Removal Task Force Report proposes spending $850,000,000
dollars for the demolition of residential buildings (it will require an
additional 500 million to 1 billion dollars to demolish larger commercial
62. Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123
(2014).
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and industrial properties).6 3 Where will this money come from? The
answer is "exit financing" through the POA. "The Exit Financing
contemplated appears to be the primary source for this funding." 64
Ironically, after the City retires all of its long term debt, it will take out
$420,000,000 in new debt, primarily to knock down buildings. 6 5
Sadly, no economic case has been made to justify this decision. The
most revealing statement in the Expert Report's assessment of the
proposed blight removal in the POA is the following sentence:
"Quantifying the near- and long-term economic impact of a successful
City of Detroit blight removal initiative is difficult due to the absence of
a calculable immediate return on the City's investment."6 6 The Report
rightfully acknowledges that there is no methodology identified in the
POA (or the Expert Report or the DBRTFR for that matter) to actually
assess the rate of return, if any, from this near billion dollar investment in
demolishing buildings. After acknowledging the absence of any theory or
method to assess the "rate of return" on blight removal, however, the
Expert Report pivots to engage in sustained "cheerlead" for the initiative.
The very same paragraph concludes that "the relative impact of blight
removal cannot be overstated." 67 How can this make sense? With no
framework in which to analyze or assess the economics of the plan, on
what bases could it be overstated, understated or stated at all?
Equally troubling, the DBRTFR itself is devoid of economic
analysis. To determine the "rate of return" on investment in blight
removal, one would have to model the underlying real estate market and
have a defensible theory about the relationship between blight removal
and property values. As detailed in the discussion of reasonableness,
however, this type of analysis is missing in the Expert Report. It is
equally absent in the DBRTFR. There is simply no "there" there to
justify the enterprise. In terms of an economic case for the substantial
investment in blight removal, it is not just that the case has not been
made, the case has not even been attempted.
While blight is a serious problem and one that needs to be managed,
it is but one of a constellation of reciprocally related causes underlying
Detroit's municipal distress. The DBRTFR and the POA, adopts a
myopic focus on demolishing buildings. Infant mortality is also a real
crisis in Detroit, but the same sense of urgency and resources are not
brought to this issue. The same could be said of maternal mortality and
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

DBRTFR, supra note 46, at 19.
Expert Report, supranote 6, at 171.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 173 (emphasis added).
Id.
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the entire meltdown of public education, but no one is seeking a billion
dollars to invest in people (human capacity) rather than property.
The Expert Report repeatedly states that it need not determine that
the POA is the best plan; just that it is reasonable and feasible. This is
true. The failure to consider any other possible plans, however, means
that the Report has no benchmark for its analysis. The notion of
"opportunity cost" is a critical economic concept. An investment is
assessed in terms of the next best alternative use of the resources. The
economic exercise is to ask whether the 850 million dollar investment in
blight removal would create greater social benefits if it were invested for
some other social purposes. Blight removal is a near-billion dollar
investment in a moribund and failed real estate market.
What would be the economic benefits of investing comparable
amounts in people-building human capacity-head start, schools,
reducing health disparities, citizen re-entry, job training and economic
opportunity? Even in a narrower economic frame, we need to ask what
would be the differential in economic benefits of spending comparable
funds in foreclosure relief designed to keep people in their homes, as
opposed to demolishing those same homes after the residents have been
forced to leave. This type of analysis is critical to an economic
evaluation of the POA, but it is missing in the Expert Report.
The DBRTFR adopts a single intervention solution to what is a
complex multi-causal phenomenon. It proposes a capital-intensive
strategy to knock down buildings with the biggest bulldozers that can be
found, where the economic benefits of those expenditures will likely
redound to suburban contractors and not the residents of Detroit. The
billion dollar expense will yield only 430 jobs, when a careful rethinking
of the capital/labor ratio of blight management could make it the biggest
jobs bill ever designed for Detroit, to the benefit of Detroit residents.
If there is any analytic substance to the legal definition offeasibility,
then the separate, unequal and segregated minimalist Detroit future city
outlined in the POA is not feasible. In the context of a city experiencing
decades of decline, the minimalist city infrastructure envisioned in the
POA will not be economically sustainable given current trends and could
ultimately collapse upon itself. Moreover, the POA fails to outline a
sufficient range of services and resources to provide opportunity to the
residents of the city. The investments in police, fire and physical security
will ultimately be self-defeating in the absence of comparable
investments in social opportunity. The tremendous imbalance reflected in
the POA could create a dynamic where more and more militant police
practices will be required to contain the problems that will be, in part, its
own creation.
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Given the many problems and limitations in the existing record, the
kindest professional opinion I can render is that the case has not yet been
made to support the legal conclusion that the POA is feasible.
V.

CONCLUSION

Citing Malcolm Gladwell, the Expert Report makes a strained effort
to frame the situation in Detroit as a "tipping point." 6 8 This is surprising
in a Report that has striven to avoid examining issues from a structural
perspective. The "tipping point" metaphor is a rhetorical move to suggest
a singular moment in history reminiscent of earlier efforts to invoke the
hero archetype in the role of Mayor and the Emergency Manager. Even
here, the author must try hard not to let notions of race and regionalism
seep back into the analysis. The Report omits the fact that the term
"tipping point" "first came into popular use in the 1970s to describe the
flight to the suburbs of whites living in the older cities of the American
Northeast." 69 If acknowledged, a discussion of the origin of "tipping
points" would have been the first and only recognition in the Report of
the role that racism and white flight played in defining the fate of
northern cities.
A more apt Gladwell book to describe the underlying dynamics of
Detroit might be "Outliers., 7 0 This book debunks the common
individualistic story of success, revealing the role of embedded systems,
structures and processes in leading to the triumphs of our great heroes
from politics, sports and business. Systems matter. Structure matters.
History matters. In pretending that they do not, and in eschewing the
Three R's of Race, Regionalism and Reconciliation, the Expert Report
has placed an analytical straightjacket on itself to the point that it cannot
see the plain facts in front of it. The Report does not see the reality of
endemic poverty, water shutoffs and tax foreclosures. It does not see the
reality of the segregation of race and wealth and regional conflict that
underlie the bankruptcy. It sees complexity only in standard issues where
those realities are reflected in the existing literature (pensions and IT
systems), but fails to see the multiple complexities that define Detroit's
municipal distress-the realities of dysfunctional regional labor,
transportation and real estate markets. The Report concludes that the
POA is feasible and will provide essential services without outlining a
framework for what cities should provide their citizens or explaining
68. Id. at 24, 197-98.
69. MALCOLM GLADWELL,
DIFFERENCE 12 (2000).
70. MALCOLM GLADWELL,

THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG
OUTLIERS: THE STORY OF SUCCESS

(2008).
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what services are not essential and why. It uncritically cheerleads for
blight removal, knowing that no defensible method has been.outlined to
demonstrate a reasonable rate of return on such spending or exploring the
social opportunity cost of alternative investments that could be spent
building human capacity, rather than demolishing buildings.
For the reasons outlined in this letter, my opinion is that a sufficient
case has not yet been made in support of the City's Plan of Adjustment.
Serious questions remain as to 1) the reasonablenessof the assumptions
underlying the City's cash flow forecasts and projections and 2) the
feasibility of the City's plan of adjustment. Based on the current state of
the record and expert analyses, I do not believe that the Court can
approve the City's Plan of Adjustment.
Sincerely,

Peter J. Hammer
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Map 1: Neighborhood Opportunity Map
for the Detroit Metro Region
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Map 2: Neighborhood Opportunity Map and
2000 Distribution of African American Population
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